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Abstract 
 
Politicians, social scientists and general readers have noted in both Cuban and 
international academic forums and periodicals that the well-being enjoyed by the Cuban 
people in the 1980s has been seriously compromised since the economic crisis of the 
1990s. Even for the most skeptical of observers it is clear that this worsening of 
conditions can be attributed not only to external factors, such as the breakup of the 
international socialist system, the tightening of the US blockade, and the worldwide 
economic crisis suffered by underdeveloped countries, but also to internal factors that 
have kept the country from taking full advantage of the human and material potential 
available on the island. 
Although Cuba is currently experiencing an economic recovery from the collapse 
in GDP in the mid 1990s following the collapse of its ties with the Socialist Bloc, it 
continues to maintain high import coefficients due to longstanding structural  
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difficulties. The country is highly dependent on food imports as a result of a deficient 
agrarian policy. It imports energy to a lesser but still significant extent, and it still 
requires many intermediate inputs for the productive process. Cuban industry and 
agriculture continue to suffer from low levels of efficiency and productivity. 
Institutional reforms in the mid-1990s allowed the population to diversify its 
sources of income. The growing role of market forces in the once state-dominated 
economy and the strategies being pursued by people for generating income have led to 
slow, but growing, social differentiation. This process continues, despite measures taken 
to counteract it through different programs related to the so-called Battle of Ideas. 
The duration of the Special Period points to the contradiction between time 
elapsed in the development of social processes and time as experienced by real human 
beings. Addressing the social inequalities unintentionally generated over the course of 
the Special Period, as the country attempted to implement profound and necessary 
economic changes with the least possible social cost, should be a priority. 
To prepare for the challenges that the country will have to face in the future, we 
will analyze the economic situation in Cuba using a set of indicators that will tell us 
about the current economic state of the country and about the social and economic 
well-being of the Cuban people in the present and recent past.  
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The Cuban Economy: A Current Evaluation and Proposals for Necessary Policy Changes 
 
Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva1 
 
Politicians, social scientists and general readers have noted in both Cuban and 
international academic forums and periodicals that the well-being enjoyed by the Cuban people 
in the 1980s has been seriously compromised since the economic crisis of the 1990s. Even for 
the most skeptical of observers it is clear that this worsening of conditions can be attributed not 
only to external factors, such as the breakup of the international socialist system, the tightening 
of the US blockade, and the worldwide economic crisis suffered by underdeveloped countries, 
but also to internal factors that have kept the country from taking full advantage of the human 
and material potential available on the island. 
 
Although Cuba is currently experiencing an economic recovery from the collapse in GDP 
in the mid 1990s following the collapse of its ties with the Socialist Bloc, it continues to maintain 
high import coefficients due to longstanding structural difficulties. The country is highly 
dependent on food imports as a result of a deficient agrarian policy. It imports energy to a lesser 
but still significant extent, and it still requires many intermediate inputs for the productive 
process. Cuban industry and agriculture continue to suffer from low levels of efficiency and 
productivity. 
 
Institutional reforms in the mid-1990s allowed the population to diversify its sources of 
income. The growing role of market forces in the once state-dominated economy and the 
strategies being pursued by people for generating income have led to slow, but growing, social 
differentiation. This process continues, despite measures taken to counteract it through different 
programs related to the so-called Battle of Ideas.2 
 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University for 
support in the preparation of this study. 
2 The Battle of Ideas is a campaign that was launched in Cuba during the dispute with the United States over the 
custody of Elian González. Since then, the campaign has continued to focus on strengthening social programs in 
Cuba with a strong emphasis on Cuban youth.   
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The duration of the Special Period3 points to the contradiction between time elapsed in 
the development of social processes and time as experienced by real human beings. Addressing 
the social inequalities unintentionally generated over the course of the Special Period, as the 
country attempted to implement profound and necessary economic changes with the least 
possible social cost, should be a priority. 
 
To prepare for the challenges that the country will have to face in the future, we will 
analyze the economic situation in Cuba using a set of indicators that will tell us about the current 
economic state of the country and about the social and economic well-being of the Cuban people 
in the present and recent past.  
 
Macroeconomic Performance  
 
The Cuban economy grew rapidly between 2001 and 2007. During this period the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an average of 7.5% per year at the constant prices of the base 
year 1997. From 2001 to 2003, however, it grew at an annual rate of just 2.9%, while between 
2004 and 2007 GDP grew at a yearly average of 9.3%.This difference was partially due to a new 
methodology 4  for calculating GDP and also to very favorable growth in the export of 
professional services in the latter period. In 2008 and 2009, however, a significant deceleration of 
the pace of economic growth took place that alerted the government in 2009 to the fact that it was 
necessary to outline a new program of economic adjustment, with a new consideration for the 
population’s well-being. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 This term is employed in Cuba to denote the period of economic adjustment that was sparked by the collapse of 
trade with the Socialist Bloc. It is considered to be continuing up to the present-day.  
4 A new methodology for calculating GDP was implemented in 2000. The revised GDP calculation includes 
estimates on the share of state spending on public health care and education, as well as subsides for transportation 
and food rations. 
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Figure 1: Growth of GDP  
(Annual percentage growth rate at constant 1997prices) 
 
 
 
Source: National Office of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Cuba,various years, Havana. 
 
 
The share of GDP derived from the agriculture, construction, and transportation sectors has 
diminished. In contrast, the share of services has increased significantly. In 2008, the service 
sector represented 75.51% of GDP. 
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Figure 2. Structure of 2008 GDP in percentages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Office of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Cuba, Havana 
 
The Cuban state’s allocation of available resources reflects the priority that it has 
accorded to social programs within its overall development strategy. Nevertheless, while gross 
fixed capital formation was 60% greater in 2006 than in 2001, its share of total spending has 
decreased to less than 10% of GDP from over 30% in 1990. 
 
The growth of GDP has been accomplished without sacrificing macroeconomic equilibria 
reached since the middle of the 1990s. The fiscal deficit has been kept to a controllable size 
(about 3.2% of GDP), but in 2008 was about 6.7% of GDP. Monetary policy has succeeded in 
reaching the key target of achieving the stability of the CADECA5 exchange rate. At the same 
time the monetary liquidity of the population reached extraordinary levels at over 25 billion 
pesos in 2008, 40% of GDP 
 
The Cuban economy has had to develop in the face of adversity including serious 
droughts, violent hurricanes, difficulties in generating electricity, and increased pressure from the 
United States that included further restrictions on travel by Cuban citizens to that country, 
                                                 
5 CADECA is the official currency exchange agency. 
3.49
13.3
6.27
1.43
75.51
Agricultural and 
Mining
Manufacturing
Construction
Electricity, 
Gas,Water
Services
5 
 
stricter limitations on remittances to Cuba, and most recently, attempts to seize Cuban assets held 
outside the country. 
 
 
Figure 3. Cumulative Liquidity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Office of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Cuba, Havana 
 
Cuba continues to suffer from structural problems in its economy, including a scarcity of 
hard currency earnings, distortions in its relative pricing system resulting from an overvalued 
official exchange rate, a lack of convertibility, monetary duality, segmented markets, poor 
performance in the sugar industry and in agriculture, and inefficiency in public entities. President 
Raúl Castro has commented on these problems in numerous public statements.6 
 
Positive results were reached in certain sectors such as petroleum and gas extraction. Oil 
production has increased six-fold since 1990. Gas production was negligible in 1990 and has 
now reached over a million cubic meters. These accomplishments have allowed Cuba to reduce 
                                                 
6 Speeches by Raul Castro on July 26, 2007 in the province of Camaguey and on February 24, 2008 at the National 
Assembly of the People’s Power Assembly in Havana. 
2,091.7
4,986.3
11,043.3
25,081.9
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
( in million pesos)
6 
 
its oil imports at a time when prices on the international market are increasing rapidly. The 
petroleum agreement with Venezuela has also helped to mitigate the inflationary price spiral of 
the crude oil Cuba imports. 
 
In general, manufacturing production has decreased steadily. The sector contributed 
13.3% to GDP in 2008, but performance varied dramatically among the different industrial 
sectors. Nickel, beverages, spirits, tobacco products, and some other manufactures increased, 
while sugar production plummeted with harvests less than 15% the size of those at the beginning 
of the 1990s.  
 
Only 1,300,000 tons of sugar was harvested in 2008 due to the unavailability of necessary 
resources for even the basic needs of the sugar-based agro-industry, a lack of stimuli to 
agricultural and other producers, and the low priority accorded to the sector during the 1990s. A 
process of decapitalization had unfavorable repercussions for crop yields and sugar production, 
leading to significant reductions in sugar exports, and reduced flows of hard currency and 
financing that affected the national economy. The closing of half the sugar refineries in the 
country left 100,000 people out of work and required a difficult retraining process. The situation 
with the unemployed and underemployed former sugar workers has still not been definitively 
resolved. New sources of productive employment for these workers must be found in the near- to 
mid-term.  
 
Agricultural production and the sale of products in agricultural markets are important to 
the population’s consumption of food products and thus to its well-being. Agricultural 
production has continued to decrease in recent years. The proportion of agriculture in the GDP 
was less than 3.49% in 2008 due to the sharp decline in the production of cane sugar, a continued 
decline in the number of livestock, and stagnation in non-sugar agriculture. While 
acknowledging the reality of tangible problems including shortages of financial and material 
resources, we must recognize that there are organizational and institutional problems in the 
Cuban economy that have had a significant negative impact on the economic performance in 
these areas.  
 
The economic reforms of the 1990s enabled some state agricultural enterprises to be 
grouped into somewhat more flexible Basic Units of Cooperative Production (Unidades Básicas 
de Producción Cooperativa), but the highly centralized environment in which they functioned 
discouraged producers and impeded any increase in yields or production. The availability of 
external supplies was inadequate and the State procurement and distribution enterprise (Acopio) 
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sets such low prices for agricultural products that they are sometimes below the cost of 
production. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates that the production of viandas (potatoes, sweet potatoes, yuca, cassava, 
plantain, and others) and of other vegetables basic to the Cuban diet (tomatoes, cabbage, lettuce, 
onions, and others) decreased at a time when food prices were rising rapidly worldwide. 
 
Figure 4. Agricultural Production (thousand tons) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Office of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Cuba,various years, Havana. 
 
There were significant price decreases in agricultural markets between 1994 and 1996 as 
the opening of these markets hampered the price speculation that had prevailed for agricultural 
goods on the black market. In addition, money became scarce and production increased and then 
stabilized. In the last 10 years, however, there has been no tendency for prices to fall in keeping 
with the decreased purchasing power of the population, especially for those households 
dependent on salaries from the state-dominated sphere of the economy. In order to lower 
consumer prices, it has become necessary to seek alternative means of increasing agricultural 
production  
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Activity has also decreased in the livestock sector, particularly regarding cattle. 
Decreased volumes of feed deriving from sugar cane led to an unfortunate dependence on 
imported animal feed. There were droughts in the eastern provinces, herd management was 
deficient, and there were structural weaknesses in overall organization. 
 
The UBPCs orientation toward raising livestock has not demonstrated significantly 
improved results. New agricultural methods clearly call for new management methods and 
mechanisms. Existing mechanisms with a centralized and vertical orientation should be replaced 
by economic-financial instruments. The State should limit itself to outlining policies, 
establishing and implementing appropriate instruments to execute them, guaranteeing the 
availability of necessary scientific-technical services, and protecting the natural environment, 
while leaving decision-making on management and production issues to microeconomic subjects. 
 
Poor performance in the agricultural sector has negative impacts on the country’s fiscal 
gap and trade deficit. For example, the amount of food that had to be imported in 2008 to reach a 
daily consumption level of 3,287 kilocalories and 89.9 grams of protein per person was greater 
than the amount imported in 1989. 
 
Although Cuba overcame the crisis of the first half of the 1990s, the years leading up to 
2008 were characterized by a deficit in the supply of available food for consumption and demand. 
While the overall nutritional state of the population has improved (with the exception of dietary 
fat intake, which is not a surprise given that oils are mostly imported and charged to consumers 
in convertible Cuban pesos), it is notable that certain levels of malnutrition have also been found 
to be present in some households. 
 
Low levels of agricultural production and the resulting increase in food imports in an 
environment of rising commodity prices mean that the country’s agricultural strategy and 
policies should be reconsidered. A way must be found to stimulate development appropriate to 
the economic environment and new ways must be found to unleash the potential of the labor 
force. Some modifications were made to agricultural policy in the first half of 2008. Among 
other measures, an incipient market for agricultural inputs has been established, land and 
livestock have been provided to private producers, and municipal enterprises have been 
strengthened, which is to say that the degree of verticality of decision-making has been reduced. 
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Construction has increased enormously in recent years. For example, growth in the sector 
was 37.7% in 2006, concentrated in the areas of petroleum, electricity, and tourism infrastructure, 
and in the areas prioritized by the government as part of what is known as the Battle of Ideas. 
These areas included housing, school, and hospital construction and the repair of existing schools 
and hospitals. By 2007, however, the value of new construction had decreased by 9% as 
investment contracted due to a discrepancy between the resources allocated to projects and the 
capacity to carry them out.  
 
Although substantial resources were invested in the 1970s and 1980s to expand the 
supply of housing, the housing deficit was still acknowledged to be a problem in 1989 and the 
crisis of the 1990s contributed to the further deterioration of the existing housing stock. In 2001 
and subsequent years, there has been a sharp drop in housing construction due to the allocation 
of resources to the recovery of housing damaged by multiple hurricanes and to other priorities. It 
has been clearly demonstrated that the construction of new housing will not by itself resolve the 
housing question. Resources must also be allocated for the maintenance of the existing housing 
stock in Cuba. 
 
The state accorded increased priority to the construction of new housing in 2006 due to 
the deterioration of existing housing stock and the housing deficit that had accumulated over 
several decades. A program was established for the construction of 100,000 housing units 
annually, emphasizing self-construction versus state-led housing development. This program was 
found to have many deficiencies and in fact has since been reduced in scope. Its shortcomings 
should be addressed in the short-term. 
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Figure 5. Completed Houses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Office of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Cuba, Havana 
 
Problems with public transportation have had a negative influence on the well-being of 
the Cuban population. Insufficient capital formation in the sector led to a rapid deterioration of 
equipment. A large-scale investment program outlined in 2007 has permitted the importation of 
buses and other transportation equipment from the People’s Republic of China. This should be 
reflected in very favorable improvements in 2008. 
 
To summarize, Cuba’s GDP is continuing to grow rapidly, but due to a deterioration in 
certain sectors, the economic recovery process is not rapid enough to regain the levels of 
economic well-being that existed prior to the crisis years in the early 1990s. New policies are 
needed to stimulate economic reactivation and increase productive dynamism while maintaining 
macroeconomic stability in order to ensure the sustainability of the advances in social equity and 
the provision of basic services that have been sustained by the Cuban government over the last 
decade. 
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In 2008 there were signs that the government was willing to take steps to make Cuban 
socialism viable, including the elimination of certain prohibitions. These changes included the 
legalization of the sale of certain consumer items, including computers and DVD players, and the 
granting of access to services, including cellular telephony, that were previously reserved for 
enterprises, the diplomatic sector, and foreign citizens. The restriction on Cubans staying at 
hotels built to serve the needs of international tourism has also been lifted. In addition, 
Resolution 9 of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security introduced measures to allow for 
salaries and wages to be set with more flexible ceilings and caps. Legal Decree 260 of 2008 
concerning the work and salaries of retired teachers and professors provides incentives to draw 
them back to the classroom, and Decree 259 allows idle land to be assigned in usufruct to private 
parties. 
 
The Evolution of the External Sector  
 
The characteristic current accounts deficit in Cuba’s balance of payments was 
transformed into a current account surplus in 2004, but overall balances have continued to 
fluctuate. In 2005, the surplus was US$140 million. Although data has not been released for 
2008, the surplus obtained in the commercial balance of goods and services in 2007 indicates 
that the results may be positive, but in 2008 the results were very negative. The factors that have 
driven this turnaround include the increased export of professional services, specifically those of 
health workers deployed in developing countries on medical missions, and the receipt of 
remittances, widely estimated to be between US$ 900 million and US$1 billion. Indeed, the 
service sector was the greatest generator of export income beginning in 2004. There were 
significant qualitative changes within the sector as the value of knowledge-intensive services 
overtook the value of the tourist sector in generating income. 
 
In contrast to sugar exports, nickel exports have increased significantly in the last three 
years, with both increased production and higher prices. Foreign sales of nontraditional high 
value-added products have also increased, including in the areas of biotechnology, 
pharmaceuticals, and advanced medical and diagnostic equipment. New markets have been 
found for these products and about 200 of them have been licensed by health authorities in 52 
countries. Nickel has continued to be Cuba’s most important export in 2008 due to high prices on 
the international market. The export of pharmaceutical and biotechnology products also took off. 
The current structure of export products indicates a significant transformation. Medicines 
constitute an important export subsector while the sugar subsector has become less important. 
Nonetheless, sugar remains one of the products for which Cuba has the most productive potential. 
12 
 
 
The recovery in the export sector is undeniable, but the value of exports in 2008 was still 
31% less than in 1989. In contrast, imports have grown rapidly, exceeding their 1989 levels by 
75% in 2008. In 2008, most of the commercial trade in merchandise was with Venezuela, China, 
Canada, Spain, the United States (due to Cuba’s food purchases), and some European countries. 
This was a structural change in the composition of trade by regions and countries compared to 
the early years of the 1990s. 
 
Cuba has recovered its ability to pay for imports and is now purchasing goods abroad at a 
significant and increasing rate. The structure of these imports does not favor capital goods, 
however, with the exception of gasoline- and diesel-powered electric generators and similar 
items. Instead, imports are concentrated in the food sector (including many products that could 
be produced domestically) and in intermediate goods. Food imports remain high due to the 
insufficient performance of the agricultural sector, as discussed above, and imports of raw 
materials and industrial equipment have increased as a result of the economic recovery. 
 
Figure 6. Foreign Trade in Goods (million Pesos) 
 
 
Source: National Office of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Cuba, Havana 
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This has led to a merchandise trade deficit of about 10 billion pesos, approximately 20% 
of the GDP. This figure is high, and it could be reduced by increasing domestic production of 
certain goods currently imported. To do so the Cuban state should give maximum priority to 
increasing worker incentives, make some necessary institutional changes, and eliminate 
excessive centralization. 
 
 
Figure 7. Foreign Trade in Goods and Services (billion Pesos) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Office of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Cuba and other information, various years, Havana. 
 
 
Income from tourism surpassed US$25 billion between 1990 and 2007, growing from 
US$243 million in 1990 to 2.236 billion convertible Cuban pesos (CUCs) in 2007. More than 7 
billion pesos were spent on tourist development during that period. Of this amount, more than 
2.3 billion pesos were spent on tourist infrastructure, airport capacity, and new technology for 
tourist services and telecommunications. Some 24 million people visited the country and the 
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number of hotel rooms increased from 12,900 to 45,000, almost half of these being administered 
by foreign hotel companies. 
 
Tourism decreased in 2006 and 2007 for domestic and international reasons. Internally, 
factors including high prices, management and maintenance difficulties at some hotels, the 
limited supply of services outside the hotel sector, and the 8% revaluation of the CUC are 
important reasons for the reduction in the growth rate of the total number of tourists entering 
Cuba. In addition, external factors such as financial turbulence, slow economic growth in the 
countries of origin of tourists, and high oil prices leading to increased transportation costs, 
especially for European tourists, has also had a significantly negative impact. In 2008, tourism 
increased by about 8.9%. 
 
Foreign investment has been concentrated in key sectors such as petroleum, nickel, 
telecommunications, and tourism. International investment by Cuba has appeared in incipient 
form, primarily in biotechnology in Asian markets such as China, India, and Malaysia. 
Venezuelan investment in the Cuban economy has increased in oil, nickel, petrochemicals, and 
telecommunications. 
 
Cuba’s credit capacity is still limited, except with China and Venezuela, the latter within 
the framework of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA). This is due not only to 
Cuba’s limited credit worthiness, but also to pressure from the United States government, which 
continues to apply punitive economic measures against the country. 
 
Prices, Income, and Employment 
 
There was a deflationary episode in 1999-2001, but inflation increased sharply after 2003. 
The increase in the consumer price index has been driven by the increase in prices in non-
regulated markets for essential consumer goods. These include higher prices for some products 
in the ration stores and agricultural markets, higher electricity rates and gas prices, and the prices 
of other products including household appliances and some food and personal hygiene items. 
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Figure 8. Consumer Price Index 
(Annual percentage variation) 
 
 
Source: National Office of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Cuba and other information, various years, Havana 
 
The evolution of this indicator is seen in Figure 8. In 2008, the inflation rate was 4.9%.  
One can see that inflation has not been high since 1995; in fact there have been decreases in 
average prices for some years. In the last period there has especially been a certain pressure to 
raise prices, with five consecutive registers of more than two per cent, but even so it remains as 
an average within the margins accepted internationally as low inflation. 
 
The population’s income is an important variable since its availability for spending is a 
necessary precondition for demand, and therefore consumption, in all accessible markets. 
Nominal income has continued to grow over the period due to the increases in wages for state 
workers in the public and state enterprise sectors, the growth of some productive activities, the 
entry of remittances to the country, and other factors. The median nominal salary, which is the 
most important component of the population’s income, has continued to grow over time, 
reaching 414 Cuban pesos in 2008, a significant increase from the median monthly salary in 
1989. However, the increase in the nominal salary has not been enough to overcome the 
deterioration in real salaries due to the even greater increases in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
over the period. This has created significant problems for the majority of households that depend 
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on salaries as the most important source of income. It is important to consider real salaries, 
which were far below those of 1989. 
 
 
Figure 9. Nominal and Real Median Monthly Salary (Pesos) 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Office of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Cuba , various years, Havana; Pavel Vidal, La 
inflación y los salarios reales en Cuba, IPS, Havana.  
  
A salary reform was implemented in 2005 mandating that professional qualifications, 
education, and knowledge base be taken into account when setting workers’ salaries. Raises were 
most common in state-financed sectors such as health and education. The social security 
pensions received by 1,468,641 citizens were subsequently raised at an annual cost of 1.035 
billion pesos. An additional 257,030 family units comprising 476,500 people began to receive 50 
additional pesos in their pensions in the form of social assistance. The minimum salary was 
raised from 100 pesos to 225 pesos. The total additional expenditure for these measures in 2005 
was over 3.4655 billion pesos. These measures alleviated the economic situation of many 
households in state-financed sectors, as well as in part for retired workers and others receiving 
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pensions. This is because the increase in liquidity during the period led to new price increases for 
scarce agricultural and black-market goods because there was no adequate increase in the 
production or importation of consumer goods. As a result, personal income remains insufficient 
to cover the necessary purchases of Cuban families due to the elevated prices for food. A portion 
of the population continues to be unable to satisfy all of its basic needs, especially for food. The 
relationship between income and consumption is highly distorted. 
 
In order to increase real salaries there must be a greater supply of products available in 
exchange for the currency in which those salaries are paid or there must be a revaluation of that 
currency. The policies being implemented at this time, however, have not proven strong enough 
to stimulate the adequate development of productive forces, i.e. labor productivity.  
 
What might be some of the causes of the current economic situation? 
 
? As a result of its structure, GDP growth rate still does not allow for greatly 
increased levels of consumption. 
? Industrial and agricultural productivity and efficiency continue to be low. 
? Due to the low profitability of enterprises, taxes on the sales and 
circulation of goods (particularly taxes on cigarettes and beverages) represent a larger 
proportion of state revenues than taxes on the profits of producers. As long as this 
situation persists neither nominal salaries nor state spending can be increased in a 
sustained fashion without creating inflationary pressure. 
? The liquidity of the population is increasing, but it is ever more 
concentrated in the hands of a few and is often held in bank accounts. 
 
The existing monetary duality and payment for consumption in a currency other than the 
Cuban peso (the proportion of the total consumption of goods and services paid from resources 
derived either from Cuban convertible pesos (CUC) or hard currency) are excessive in view of 
the overvalued official exchange rate. This situation has increased social inequality. It should be 
recognized that a portion of the population’s consumption is derived from the access to goods 
obtained in regulated and rationed markets where prices are quite low or which are distributed 
without payment. In light of the population’s income, these goods are affordable; their supply, 
however, is limited. 
 
The total volume of remittances has been decreasing as a result of laws passed by the 
George W. Bush administration. Although it is not possible to establish remittance volume with 
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any precision due to the different means by which they are sent, it seems clear that they have not 
decreased very greatly if one uses the continued sales in “dollar stores” (Tiendas de 
Recuperación de Divisas - TRDs) as a measure since these have continued to increase over time. 
 
The official unemployment rate has been low since 2008 at 1.6%, compared to a rate of 
7.9% in 1995. However, it should be noted that job creation in recent years has been based on the 
country’s development strategy of concentrating on the tertiary sector. Since 2002 in particular, 
job creation has been concentrated in social programs associated with the so-called Battle of 
Ideas. The fact that less people are working in Cuban industry is symptomatic of the continued 
paralysis of many activities, reductions in industrial investment, and the lack of necessary hard 
currency with which to purchase industrial inputs and improve the utilization of existing capacity. 
 
It should be remembered that employment policy itself has contributed to underemployment in 
many cases. A critical fact underlying many problems is that workers lack motivation on the job 
due to the time and resources they need to dedicate to securing their basic needs. This 
significantly detracts from the creative energy that would under normal circumstances be 
available to them for their official profession. This difficulty is reflected in daily life. Many 
professionals working in the fields for which they were trained must have a second job to 
supplement their low salaries and ensure the fulfillment of daily needs. In other cases, 
individuals simply migrate to work in other sectors where their specialized education plays little 
role, but where they are able to secure greater economic security. In the worst of cases, 
individuals seek employment outside Cuba in order to send remittances to their families that 
remain on the island. 
 
The state should continue to play a leading role in addressing and resolving these 
problems. While there is confidence in its ability to do so, the potential for family and individual 
capital should also be recognized to a greater extent. This can happen if recognition of the assets 
of the households is encouraged and conditions are created for these assets to be utilized within 
the limits of the law.7 
 
 
                                                 
7 Angela Ferriol, Maribel Ramos, and Lía Añé. ¿Pobreza en la capital ? INIE- CEPDE/ONE, 2004. Havana. 
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Fiscal Policy 
 
In general, the national budget is the principal source of financing for social policies. The 
share of the fiscal resources for these policies is designated in the national currency and 
disbursement of these resources is structured in a decentralized fashion. The use of funds is 
determined in keeping with the necessities of each region.  
 
The share of government spending allocated for expenditures in scarcer hard currency is 
structured in a much more centralized fashion. A significant portion of financing for investments 
in infrastructure and its modernization are also supported by the state budget and to some extent 
from donations by international institutions. In practice, the degree of centralization of the 
allocation of resources in hard currency acts to counter the decentralization that is being sought 
in the financing of policies in national currency based on local disbursements. 
 
The 1990s were characterized by a tendency toward increasing current spending in budgetary 
outlays despite the economic crisis (Special Period) described above. Many of the increases have 
been in the areas expected to have the greatest social impact. Cuban economic policy has been 
directed toward meeting social needs, a goal that received particular emphasis in 2001 and the 
years that followed. The most important objectives of the national government have included 
continuation of the provision of free quality educational and health services, guaranteeing the 
solvency of the social security system, and meeting the needs of senior citizens, the handicapped, 
and other groups and individuals that have been most affected by the rise in inequality within 
Cuban society. The government’s so-called Battle of Ideas focuses on improving the social 
policies that have the greatest impact on the quality of these educational and health indicators. 
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Figure 10. State Budget Performance 
 
Source: National Office of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Cuba, Havana 
 
While the Cuban model has always sought to increase social equity, it has focused more 
on making services available for free than on providing monetary income to citizens to ensure 
their access to these services. Consequently, universal access to services is a necessary pre-
condition in social policy design. Spending on education has increased over time to improve the 
quality of services and to meet the needs imposed by demographic growth, and spending on 
public health has increased in recent years in order to improve levels of health and to ameliorate 
reduced service quality. Deteriorated facilities including polyclinics, hospitals, and pharmacies 
have been rehabilitated. 
 
Demography 
 
Demographic studies in Cuba in recent years have characterized the country as being in 
the advanced stage or culmination of a demographic transition, or possibly in the early stages of 
a second transition. All studies recognize that the prediction for zero or negative population 
growth in the next ten to fifteen years has come to fruition sooner than expected. In fact, the 
250
1250
2250
3250
4250
5250
6250
7250
8250
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
 E
st
Education Public Health Defence Social Security Housing and Community services
(MMP)
21 
 
growth rate of the Cuban population has been negative since 2006. Both the reduction in the 
birth rate and the growth of the over-60 population has accelerated. Sustained emigration is 
another contributing factor. 
 
The population grew at the very slow rate of 0.2 per thousand in 2005. It decreased by 0.4 
per thousand in 2006, 0.2 per thousand in 2007, and 0.1 per thousand in 2008. The share of the 
population between 15 and 59 years of age as a proportion of the total population has grown in 
the last fifteen years. This group totaled over 7.7 million people in 2008. The proportion of the 
population between birth and 14 years of age has decreased as a result of the low fertility rate 
and the proportion of the population 60 years of age and older has increased. In 2008, about 2.1 
million Cubans were between birth and 14 years old and about 1.8 million were 60 years or older. 
 
The key characteristic of the Cuban demographic transition is the aging of the population. 
The entire society and all its institutions must prepare to deal with this phenomenon, which 
began in the early 1970s. By the end of that decade the gross reproduction rate had fallen below 
replacement level and the population of people 60 years and older had surpassed 12% of the total. 
In 2008 it reached 17.0%.  
 
Other characteristics of the country’s rapid demographic change include changes in the 
population’s territorial mobility. Internal migration decreased in the 1990s. However, emigration 
increased to a rate of over 30,000 people per year for a total of over 200,000 people in the last 
five years. Population mobility (excluding forced and induced migration) has historically been 
motivated by a search for opportunities for social reproduction, including factors such as 
incorporation into the productive process as well as the consumption of goods or services, 
including services directly or indirectly associated with individual or family self-realization.  
 
The infant mortality rate is an effective indicator for evaluating the performance of the 
health sector, especially primary care and infant and maternal care. Cuba’s infant mortality rate 
has declined markedly since 1960. In the first decades after that year the decline was attributable 
to post-neonatal health care, principally the widespread campaigns for vaccination programs 
against immuno-preventable diseases. Children are now vaccinated against 13 diseases. The 
infant mortality rate in 2008 was 4.7 per 1,000 live births, confirming Cuba’s leading place 
among Latin American countries and its position among the 30 countries in the world with the 
lowest probability of death after a live birth. 
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Principal Challenges and Future Actions 
 
The Cuban economy faces many complex challenges to maintaining its social and 
economic project and retaining the capacity to increase the well-being of the population. Social 
and economic distortions and disequilibria must be confronted, and time is short. 
 
 Internal factors that continue to constrain economic growth must be 
overcome in the short to medium-term. Among them are financial restrictions on hard 
currency, which continue to be one of the direct causes of unsatisfied consumer needs. 
 State enterprises are currently subject to an adverse environment related to 
problems associated with price formation, the official exchange rate, the exchange regime, 
the centralized authorization required for purchasing, and other planning, regulation, and 
control mechanisms. Enterprises must achieve a level of efficiency sufficient to be 
competitive on the international market.  
 The so-called income-consumption model is still seriously distorted as 
evidenced by its effects on labor motivation. Labor compensation systems must be made 
coherent to resolve problems in satisfying the needs of workers through salaries, other 
forms of income, or redistributive channels. Other problems that must be addressed 
include a reduction in the degree of market segmentation and improvements in the 
availability and provision of goods and services.  
 The restructuring of the sugar agro-industry remains incomplete. The 
recovery of production in the industry has stalled, also affecting the production of food 
on land ceded to growers for this purpose by the Sugar Ministry (MINAZ). 
 There has been no progress toward achieving food self-sufficiency 
through the improvement of the agricultural management model. 
 Given the cumulative effects of deterioration, greater short-term priority 
should be placed on addressing the decapitalization of infrastructure and equipment. 
 The productive specialization of the Cuban economy must be changed 
radically from an economy based on the exploitation of natural resources to an economy 
based on the intensive use of knowledge. The existence of Cuba’s strong potential in 
knowledge-intensive development does not by itself guarantee the achievement of 
positive outcomes. 
 The strategic challenge is to grow, as other necessary benefits derive from 
growth. However, new springboards must be found to increase production. Performance 
is declining in sectors and activities such as tourism that have been used to increase 
production in the past. 
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 Measures should be accelerated to recover previously attained levels of 
social equity. Despite progress in recent years with measures such as the delivery of 
household appliances associated with the Energy Revolution, the problem of family 
income has not been resolved satisfactorily for the majority of Cubans families. Part of 
the population is still unable to cover all their expenses with the formal income that they 
receive. As a result they have to seek income from alternative sources or do without a 
series of goods and/or services. 
 While Cuba is an advanced country as measured by social indicators 
concerning health, education, culture, and other areas, access to certain goods and 
services in areas including recreation, travel, transportation, and communication is far 
below the world average for comparable countries. 
 Cuba reaped substantial advantages from its relationship with Venezuela 
in the 2004-2007 period. Nevertheless, the relationship has additional untapped potential 
to develop reindustrialization programs that would complement and support newly 
dynamic sectors and allow for the recovery and expansion of sectors that are strategic in 
light of their impact on the quality of life of the population and on the external sector. 
 Cuban state enterprises have not demonstrated a capacity for economic 
innovation as one of their basic functions. Not only does the economic system suffer 
from functional deficiencies, but it has reached a kind of dead end from which a 
substantial transformation will be required if it is to emerge.8  
 In conclusion, economic reform should be seen as the first of the structural 
transformations that the country requires. Cuba’s economic problem is that the current 
economic system cannot serve as a starting point for the country’s development.9 
 
Necessary Policy Changes 
 
The Cuban economy is in urgent need of a profound economic or structural 
transformation with an emphasis on decentralization. A future strategy must include the 
decentralization of forms of non-state property not only in agriculture but also in manufacturing 
and services. The state must play the regulatory role that is appropriate in relation to these 
economic activities and must concentrate its efforts on the country’s fundamentally strategic 
sectors. 
                                                 
8 Monreal, Pedro, El problema económico de Cuba, in Espacio Laical, publication of the Archdiocese of Havana, 
April 2008, No. 28, Havana. 
9 Ibid 
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Fifty years of Cuban socialism have demonstrated with some exceptions that 
recentralization and distancing from the market have provoked recessions and other negative 
economic phenomena. This tells us that we should not necessarily follow this road in the future, 
and that without altering the socialist project to which many of the Cubans on the island have 
committed themselves, the state should study a future role for itself regulating enterprises rather 
than directly administering them. 
 
Agriculture must be granted the autonomy that the new forms of production, especially 
the UBPCs, call for. Significant amounts of State land should be provided to those who are able 
to make it productive. Commodity prices paid by the State to small agricultural producers should 
continue to be increased, and the development of a sugar-based energy agro-industry should be 
promoted to revitalize the sugar industry and expand the production of derivatives, especially 
alcohols.  
 
Two steps should be taken as part of a process to eradicate monetary duality. The 
devaluation of the official exchange rate should be considered and an exchange mechanism 
should be established for use of the Cuban peso by institutions.  
 
The ration card should be replaced with a new system for subsidizing food that is more 
efficient and has better distributive effects. The number of ministries should be reduced and the 
functions and level of centralization in the public sector should probably be changed.  
 
Changes are taking place within an economic policy that seems to have the following 
priorities: implementing import substitution (particularly in agriculture), stimulating a return of 
foreign investment, and diversifying international commercial and financial relations. While 
these transformations and policies are being applied, they will stimulate or motivate new 
practices within the Cuban system. All evidence is that changes in the Cuban economy are just 
getting started. The steps taken up to this time represent only a small proportion of the changes 
required in order to meet the stated objectives and increase the purchasing power of Cuban 
families. 
 
Finally, there is a need for new reforms to the Cuban economic system in several key 
areas including measures to enhance the role of the market, increase the degree of regulation of 
the forms of property, and improve the organizational model of enterprises. In the words of 
Cuban economist Pedro Monreal, “... in the case of Cuba, a new economic reform is a necessary 
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first precondition to the other structural changes that the country requires in order for its 
development to progress.”  
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